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Introduction
Prospective memory is memory for activities to be
performed in the future. Examples include remembering to
turn off your cell phone during a lecture, remembering to give
your friend Patty a message, and remembering to actually
attach an attachment to an email message. It is often
contrasted with retrospective memory, which is the type of
memory that psychologists typically study. Retrospective
memory is memory for past events, such as memory of the
plot of a movie that you saw two weeks ago, memory for the
content of a lecture that you heard last month, and memory for
what you had for breakfast this morning.
If you think about it even minimally, our lives are full of
prospective memory demands. For example, when I get up in
the morning, I need to remember to take my vitamins, to make
my lunch, to pack my book bag with the things that I will
need at school, and to stuff my gym bag with the items that I
will need later in the day. Then, I need to remember to put all
those items in my car and later to bring them to my office.
During the day, I need to remember to go to class (thankfully
I have never forgotten that), make announcements in class
(unfortunately I have forgotten those on many occasions), and
to attend various appointments and committee meetings
throughout the day (regretfully, I have forgotten some of those
too). And, at the end of the day, I may need to remember to
meet my wife at an agreed upon time and location (I’m still
married).
In an attempt to document the prevalence of prospective
memory in everyday life, I ask my students on the first day of
class to write down the last thing they remember forgetting. I
then classify their memory failures as either retrospective or
prospective memory failures. So if someone wrote that she
was at a party recently and temporarily forgot a person’s
name, I would classify that as a retrospective memory failure.
By contrast, if someone wrote that he forgot to return a book
to the library, I would classify that as a prospective memory
failure. Regardless of whether I conduct this exercise with
college-age students or older adults, it is always the case that
the majority of the failures are prospective memory failures.
It is also the case that many of our embarrassing memory
failures involve prospective memory. You can probably think
of an embarrassing occasion on which you forgot to perform
an intended action. My most embarrassing failure was
forgetting my first department meeting as chair of the
department. Although I was highly prepared for this meeting,
a student called me down to the lab about 15 minutes before
the department meeting began, and I got completely absorbed
in solving the immediate problems there. It goes without

saying that that failure of memory created an inauspicious
start to my new leadership position!
Prospective memory failures can also have serious
consequences. As of 2008, more than 50 percent of Americans
take prescription medications on a regular basis. And as you
might imagine, older adults take more medication than any
other age group. Because it is not unusual for older adults to
take three, four, or five medications regularly, forgetting to
take one’s medication can contribute to poor health. Indeed,
for older adults, this kind of forgetting can threaten
independent living.
Despite the prevalence and importance of prospective
memory for everyday life, there has been relatively little
research in the field. As you can see in Figure 1, there was
virtually no research prior to 1990—in stark contrast to the
hundreds of thousands of studies that had been conducted on
retrospective memory. There is steadily increasing interest in
prospective memory, however, and empirical and theoretical
papers on this topic are now regularly appearing in our best
journals.

Figure 1. The growth of research on prospective memory (adapted
from Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006).
To give you a concrete idea of how we study prospective
memory in the laboratory, I will describe a typical paradigm.
As can be seen in Figure 2, we first engage participants in
what we call an ongoing task. For example, we might tell
them that our central interest is in having them rate words for
the ease with which they can be imaged. So, for this task,
participants might be presented with words one at a time in
the center of a computer screen and then be directed to rate
each word on a 5-point scale, where 1 indicates very difficult
to image (e.g., truth) and 5 indicates very easy to image (e.g.,
chair). Once participants understand this task and have had
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some practice with it, we tell them that we have an additional
interest in their ability to remember to perform an action in
the future and, specifically, that if they ever see a particular
word (e.g., the word rake) in the context of the imagery-rating
task, they should press a designated key. We then introduce a
delay, during which the participants are asked to perform
several other activities. After this delay, we reintroduce the
ongoing imagery-rating task, and we do not remind them of
the prospective memory task. The target word rake might
occur three or four times among 400 or so imagery-rating
trials, and our measure of prospective remembering is the
proportion of times out of four that participants remember to
press the designated key when the target word rake occurs. To
us, this is analogous to being busily engaged in the demands
of life and yet having to remember to give your friend Patty a
message when you see her.

1.

Present participants with instructions and practice trials for
an ongoing task (e.g., imagery rating).

2.

Present participants with the prospective memory
instructions (e.g., “Press the Q key whenever you see the
word rake in the context of the ongoing task”).

3.

A delay is introduced during which participants perform
other activities (e.g., participants might perform other
memory tasks and/or fill out demographics forms)

4.

Reintroduce the ongoing task (imagery rating) without
reminding participants of the prospective memory task.

5.

The prospective memory target (rake) occurs several times
in the ongoing task, and prospective memory performance
is measured by the proportion of times participants
remember to press the designated key when the target
occurs.
Figure 2. A typical paradigm for studying prospective

Theories of Prospective Memory Retrieval
An important question is, what is different about
prospective memory? In the typical retrospective-memory
task, participants might be presented with a list of words to
learn and then at some point the experimenter puts the
participants in what we call a retrieval mode—that is, the
experimenter asks them to start remembering the list of words
that was presented earlier (Tulving, 1983). The experimenter
might present participants with some cues to help them
remember, but the critical feature is that the experimenter asks
them to start remembering. As can be seen in the typical
prospective-memory paradigm described in Figure 2, a central
difference is that in testing prospective memory the
experimenter does not put participants in a retrieval mode
when the target word occurs. Thus, when the word rake
occurs in the context of the imagery-rating task, no one
reminds them to check their memory for what they were
supposed to do when the word rake occurs. Instead, somehow,

participants have to switch from analyzing how easy it is to
image words to seeing the word rake as a cue for an action. So
a central question in the prospective-memory literature is how
does the cognitive system accomplish remembering when
people are not specifically trying to remember at the time?
There are currently two major theories that address this
question. One theory is that we remember to perform the
intended action through monitoring processes (Smith, 2003).
The idea here is that when we form an intention, we initiate
monitoring processes, which can sometimes feel like active
and conscious monitoring and sometimes can occur
unconsciously. Regardless of whether monitoring is conscious
or not, the important assumptions in this theory are that
monitoring always draws on a limited capacity of working
memory resources and that monitoring is always necessary for
prospective memory retrieval. Thus, if our monitoring lapses,
we will forget.
My good friend and long-time colleague Mark McDaniel
and I have proposed a very different theory, which we call the
multiprocess theory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; 2007).
Because remembering to perform actions in the future is
central to our lives, we believe that it is adaptive to have a
flexible system that uses a variety of mechanisms to
accomplish prospective remembering. We believe that if we
relied exclusively on monitoring, then prospective memory
retrieval would be too fragile. In particular, we believe that
there are also spontaneous retrieval processes. By spontaneous
retrieval processes, we mean that the occurrence of an
appropriate cue can cause an intention to pop in to mind, even
when we are not monitoring (i.e., when no resources are
devoted to looking for or monitoring for the target).
Although we have developed a couple of theories about
exactly how spontaneous retrieval can occur, one theory is
that during planning, people form an association between the
target cue (e.g., the target word rake) and the intended action
(e.g., pressing the Q key). This association is stored in longterm memory and later, when the target cue is encountered,
we believe that there is an associative system (very much like
the hippocampal system described by Moscovitch, 1994; see
McDaniel & Einstein, 2011) that delivers the intended action
to consciousness. The idea is that if someone has formed a
good encoding of that association and if that person fully
processes the cue at retrieval, the intention (press the Q key)
should pop into awareness when the individual later processes
the target word rake.
A Test of the Theories
The key difference between the monitoring and
multiprocess theories is that the multiprocess theory assumes
the existence of spontaneous retrieval processes, and a goal of
our research has been to test for the existence of these kinds
of retrieval processes. So how can we scientifically test
whether a thought pops into awareness when a target word
occurs? One might assume that you could use neuroimaging
techniques to investigate this issue, but current neuroimaging
methods require numerous trials and are unable to detect an
occasional thought popping into mind. Being a cognitive
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psychologist, I am interested in studying mental processes
scientifically, and the way that we do that is to infer them
from behavior. So in order to measure whether or not a
thought can pop into awareness, we have to creatively design
experimental conditions that enable us to make this inference.
Although we have developed several methods for inferring
spontaneous retrieval processes, the most ingenious method
was inspired by one of my undergraduate research students,
Ruthann Thomas, who recently finished a PhD at the
University of Toronto and then a post-doctoral position at
Washington University in St. Louis. She is now a professor at
Hendrix College in Arkansas. Her idea was to start the
experiment with the typical first two steps of a prospective
memory paradigm (see Figure 2) but then introduce a twist in
the procedure. That is, she involved participants in an ongoing
task, which was the image-rating task used in the example
described earlier, and had them practice this task until they
thoroughly understood it. Next, Ruthann gave participants
prospective-memory instructions. Specifically, she told them
that we had a secondary interest in their ability to remember
to perform an action in the future, and that they should press
the designated Q key whenever they saw the word rake during
the image-rating task.
After being convinced that participants understood the
instructions, she departed from the typical prospectivememory paradigm by purposely asking participants to suspend
their intention to remember during an intervening speed task.
The speed task was in actuality what we call a lexical-decision
task. For this task, participants are presented with strings of
letters in the middle of the computer screen and simply are
asked to determine whether the letters form a word or not.
Thus, if they see the letters abtel they would press the no key,
whereas if they see the letters table, they would press the yes
key. A critical feature of this task is that she told participants
that our sole interest during this task was in their ability to
perform this speed task as quickly and accurately as possible
and to ignore all other intentions while they were performing
it. Nonetheless, she presented the word rake during this speed
task, as well as a control word that was matched on all
dimensions with the word rake.
As you might imagine, performance on this speed task is
nearly perfect, and the interest is in the speed of responding.
We believe that this experimental design provides a good test
of the theories because participants should not have been
monitoring during the speed task (and indeed, we have
evidence that they were not monitoring). Thus, according to
monitoring theory, whenever the target word rake occurred, it
should have gone by unnoticed. That is, it should have been
processed like any other word and had very rapid response
times. According to the multiprocess theory, however,
presenting the word rake to participants in the context of the
speed task, even though participants were not monitoring,
should cause the prospective memory to pop into awareness,
and this should slow down participants’ speed of pressing the
yes key to indicate that it is a word. Thus, according to the
multiprocess theory, there should be slowing in response to
the target word relative to matched control items. This is
exactly what happened as participants were about 50

milliseconds slower to respond that rake was a word (relative
to the matched control word). Our interpretation of these
results is that the target word rake was “loaded” in some sense
so that whenever it occurred, it caused the intended action to
be spontaneously retrieved and slowed down participants’
speed of deciding that it was a word (Einstein, McDaniel,
Thomas, Mayfield, Shank, Morrisette, &Breneiser, 2005; see
also Scullin, Einstein, & McDaniel, 2009). Thus, the pattern
of results suggests the existence of spontaneous retrieval
processes and supports the multiprocess theory.
Does Aging Affect Spontaneous Retrieval?
In our most recent research, we wondered whether normal
aging compromises spontaneous retrieval processes. One of
the most common complaints of older adults is memory
difficulties (Einstein & McDaniel, 2004), and laboratory
research clearly shows that normal aging compromises
performance on many retrospective memory tasks (McDaniel,
Einstein, & Jacoby, 2008). An intriguing pattern in the
research, however, is that aging tends to have greater effects
on cognitively demanding retrieval tasks (like trying to
remember the details of a move that you saw a month ago)
and smaller or no effects on more automatic retrieval
processes (perhaps like spontaneous retrieval). To examine
the possibility that spontaneous retrieval is spared with
normal aging, we tested your adults (college students at
Furman University who were 17 to 23 years old) and healthy
older adults (recruited from the Greenville community and
between 61 and 84 years of age) in a suspended intention
paradigm like the one described above. Our interest was in
whether the target word rake, when it appeared in the speed
task, would go by unnoticed and be processed just as quickly
as the control word or would lead to slowing (as it does in
young adults). As you can see in Figure 3, the exciting
finding is that older adults showed just as much slowing to
target words as young adults; thus, spontaneous retrieval
seems to be spared with normal aging. In a new paper with
five Furman students as coauthors (Mullet, Scullin, Hess,
Scullin, Arnold, & Einstein, 2013), we replicated this finding
as well as found additional evidence that spontaneous retrieval
is preserved in normal aging.
Improving Your Prospective Memory
I will close by describing a strategy that has been shown to
be effective in improving prospective memory. The strategy is
based on the research and theorizing of Peter Gollwitzer
(Gollwitzer, 1999), who is very interested in how to get
people to follow through on their intentions. He believes that
although people often form very strong intentions, they tend
to form very general intentions, such as “I will take my
medication.” Because he believes that the “the road to hell is
paved with general intentions,” he argues that people need to
go beyond forming general intentions and instead create
implementation intentions. These take the form of “when
situation x arises, I will perform y.” Thus, instead of saying “I
will take my medication,” one should form the
implementation intention “at breakfast in the morning, I will
take my medication.” The idea here is that it is important to
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Figure 3. Lexical decision response times (in milliseconds) to
target- and matched-control items for young and older adults (from
Mullet, Scullin, Hess, Scullin, Arnold, & Einstein, 2013).

connect the intended action to a triggering cue. And, to the
extent that you have formed a good encoding of this
association, it is very likely that when having breakfast in the
morning, the thought about taking your medication will pop
into mind. Gollwitzer believes that forming implementation
intentions allows us to switch from using monitoring to
relying on spontaneous retrieval processes. The evidence is
compelling that implementation intentions help people of all
ages remember to perform intended actions, and I encourage
you to conceptualize your prospective memory tasks in the
form of implementation intentions.
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Conclusion
In closing, I want to thank the South Carolina Academy of
Sciences and the South Carolina Research Authority for the
Governor’s Excellence in Scientific Research Award at a
Predominantly Undergraduate Institution and for the
opportunity to present you with an overview of my research
on prospective memory. I also want to thank the many
undergraduate students who have contributed so creatively to
my understanding of prospective memory and who have
enriched my life.
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